End the FED: Take Two… The Strength of Two Pauls

The globalist elite will have to deal with two Pauls; one in the House of Representatives and one in the Senate.

Reuters

Republican Representative Ron Paul on Thursday said he will push to examine the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy decisions if he takes control of the congressional subcommittee that oversees the central bank as expected in January.

“I think they’re way too independent. They just shouldn’t have this power,” Paul, a longtime Fed critic, said in an interview with Reuters. “Up until recently it has been modest but now it’s totally out of control.”

Paul is currently the top Republican on the House of Representatives subcommittee that oversees domestic monetary policy, and is likely to head the panel when Republicans take control of the chamber in January.

That could create a giant headache for the Fed, which earlier this year fended off an effort headed by Paul to open up its internal deliberations on interest rates and monetary easing to congressional scrutiny.

Paul, who has written a book called “End the Fed,” has been a fierce critic of the central bank’s efforts to boost the economy through monetary policy.

“It’s an outrage, what is happening, and the Congress more or less has not said much about it,” he said.

Paul said his subcommittee would also push to examine the country’s gold reserves and highlight the views of economists who believe that economic downturns are caused by bad monetary policy, not the vagaries of the free market.

Global organizations like the International Monetary Fund also will come under scrutiny, he said.

“Eventually we’re going to have monetary reform. I do not believe the dollar can be the reserve standard of the world,” said Paul, who has called for returning the United States to a currency backed by gold or silver.

Many economists say that the Fed’s decisive actions during the 2008 financial crisis prevented the deep recession that followed from turning into a depression. But grassroots outrage over the bank bailouts and other Fed actions helped propel many Republican candidates to victory in Tuesday’s congressional elections — including Paul’s son, Rand Paul, who will represent Kentucky in the Senate.

“With a lot of new members coming and the problems getting worse rather better, there’s going to be a lot more people who are going to be looking for answers,” Paul said.

Secretive Committee meets again to “save Euro”

WSJ

Two months after Lehman Brothers collapsed in the fall of 2008, a small group of European leaders set up a secret task force—one so secret that they dubbed it “the group that doesn’t exist.”

Its mission: Devise a plan to head off a default by a country in the 16-nation euro zone.

When Greece ran into trouble a year later, the conclave, whose existence has never before been reported, had yet to agree on a strategy. In a prelude to a cantankerous public debate that would later delay Europe’s response to the euro-zone debt crisis until the eleventh hour, the task force struggled to surmount broad disagreement over whether and how the euro zone should rescue one of its own. It never found the answer.

A Wall Street Journal investigation, based on dozens of interviews with officials from around the EU, reveals that the divisions that bedeviled the task force pushed the currency union perilously close to collapse. In early May, just hours before Germany and France broke their stalemate and agreed to endorse a trillion-dollar fund to rescue troubled euro-zone members, French Finance Minister Christine Lagarde told her delegation the euro zone was on the verge of breaking apart, according to people familiar with the matter.

The euro zone’s near death had stakes for people around the world. A wave of government defaults on Europe’s periphery could have triggered a new crisis in the international banking system, with even worse consequences for the global economy than the failure of Lehman.

The dangerous dithering was driven by ideological divisions that continue to paralyze the currency union’s search for solutions to its structural flaws. Deep differences on economic policy between Europe’s frugal north and laxer south, between Germany and France, and between national governments and central EU institutions hindered an effective early response to the crisis. Only when faced with calamity—the collapse of the euro zone—did leaders put aside their differences and reach a compromise.

Complicating matters: The two most important politicians deciding the fate of the euro often had conflicting agendas—and much at stake personally.

French President Nicolas Sarkozy, known in France as the “hyper-president” for his relentless flurry of new initiatives, faced declining approval ratings as his domestic economic overhaul stalled. The excitable 55-year-old leader saw that Greece’s woes could rock the euro zone. Mr. Sarkozy seized on the issue as an opportunity to prove his leadership chops and thus shore up his popularity.

For German Chancellor Angela Merkel, 56, the crisis was the biggest test of her career. A trained physicist known for her cautious, deliberative style, she feared a backlash from German voters and lawmakers, and defeat in Germany’s supreme court, if she risked taxpayer money on serial deficit-sinner Greece. Despite pressure from Mr. Sarkozy, she fiercely resisted a quick fix.

When Mr. Sarkozy barreled into one meeting with camera crews and photographers in tow, Ms. Merkel icily ordered the cameras out: “I won’t let you do this to me,” she said, warning she wouldn’t play the part of “the stubborn old bag.”

Europe eventually did establish a rescue fund in May. By then the price of calm had soared, requiring a pledge of €750 billion. It defused the panic but hasn’t snuffed out the crisis: Unsustainable borrowing still poses huge challenges, especially in Greece and Ireland.

The danger of a government-debt crisis in the euro zone began to preoccupy top European policy makers in October 2008. Hungary, an EU member which doesn’t use the euro, found itself unable to sell bonds to jittery investors. The EU, using an existing but little-used program, and the International Monetary Fund and World Bank swiftly propped up Hungary by pledging about €20 billion in loans.

But it soon became apparent that the euro zone had no tools to save one of its own. EU treaties made clear the facility used for Hungary was off limits to euro members. For most EU officials, the IMF was taboo, too: Its loans were fine for poor ex-Communist nations, they felt, but not for developed euro members.

In March 2009, French Treasury official Xavier Musca was preparing to step down as chairman of the Economic and Financial Committee, an influential body of technocrats who manage EU economic policy. He briefed his successor, Thomas Wieser of Austria, on the duties. At the end of a long list, he added one more. “Incidentally,” Mr. Musca said, “there’s a group that doesn’t exist.”

The secret task force, coordinated by the committee chairman, had been meeting surreptitiously since November 2008 to craft a plan should a Hungary-style crisis strike a euro nation. Membership was limited to senior policy makers—usually just below ministerial level—from France, Germany, the European Commission, Europe’s central bank and the office of Jean-Claude Juncker, the Luxembourg premier who heads an assembly of euro finance ministers.

The task force met in the shadows of the EU’s many councils and summits in Brussels, Luxembourg and other capitals, often gathering at 6 a.m. or huddling over sandwiches late at night. Participants kept colleagues in their own governments in the dark, for fear leaks would trigger rampant speculation in financial markets.

Potential crisis candidates were obvious: Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain, a group of deeply indebted states derisively tagged with the acronym “PIGS” by bond traders.

A gap quickly opened up between Germany, attached to euro-zone rules it viewed as banning bailouts for profligate countries, and France, which wanted greater freedom for national governments to support each other as they saw fit.

A fault line also developed over whether EU institutions should run any bailout operation. The European Commission, the union’s executive branch, pushed for a central role in raising and lending funds—and found an ally in France. Germany, wary of a power grab, was deeply reluctant to put its cash in Brussels’ hands.

The German finance ministry feared the commission was trying to establish a precedent for centralized European public borrowing, through EU bonds. That would imply Germany, Europe’s strongest creditor, subsidizing other nations. Instead, Germany insisted any aid must come via loans by the individual euro-zone members to a stricken country. That way Berlin, writer of the biggest check, could control the process and force a wayward recipient to reform itself.

The philosophical divide among task-force members persisted for nearly a year. Last October, it ceased to be academic.

That month, Greece’s newly elected Socialist government declared the country’s 2009 budget deficit was heading for 12.5% of gross domestic product—more than three times the previous government’s official forecast.

Stunned investors began to dump Greek bonds. Greece faced daunting debt repayments in spring 2010, and it wasn’t at all clear if it would have the money to make them.

By February, it became obvious that the 16-nation euro zone would have to do something to address the Greek bond meltdown. The secret task force of France, Germany and EU bureaucrats opened its doors to the rest of the member countries—except Greece.

A summit of EU leaders had been planned for Feb. 11 to mull Europe’s long-term economic goals. Governments insisted publicly that Greece was “not on the agenda.” The hope, say aides to several European leaders, was that if Europe didn’t upset the markets by talking about the matter, Greece might be able to sell enough bonds to escape trouble.

But Greek bond prices—a key measure of investor confidence—began plunging in the days before the meeting. Luxembourg’s Mr. Juncker convened an emergency teleconference of euro-zone finance ministers on the eve of the summit. They agreed on a statement to be read at the summit’s conclusion pledging “support” for Greece.

In Berlin’s austere chancellery building, Ms. Merkel wasn’t happy. Her advisers were telling her that Greece’s problems ran deeper than a short-term cash shortage: The country was economically uncompetitive and living beyond its means. Without a deep overhaul, a quick-fix bailout would keep Greece afloat for only a few months, they warned. In addition, Germany’s supreme court would strike down a bailout, the advisers warned, unless it was absolutely unavoidable.

Deep in the night, Ms. Merkel called other leaders, including President Sarkozy, and made it clear she would veto any promise of aid for Greece unless Athens took much tougher action to cut its public spending and overhaul its economy.

Mr. Sarkozy replied that Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou was already taking brave action.

“Now it is time for Europe to help,” he said.

“The financial markets will say this is not a solution,” Ms. Merkel told the French leader.

The next day’s summit, on a Thursday, was scheduled for 10:15 a.m. at the Bibliotheque Solvay, a historic library on a Brussels hilltop. Late Wednesday, EU President Herman Van Rompuy of Belgium postponed it by more than two hours. Snowy weather was the official explanation given for the delay.

In reality, Mr. Van Rompuy huddled that morning in his office on the fifth floor of the EU’s summit building with a few key leaders—including Ms. Merkel, Mr. Sarkozy and the head of the European Central Bank, Jean-Claude Trichet. Other European leaders were cooling their heels at the library. On currency markets, the euro was gyrating in anticipation of a bold rescue—or a bust.

Mr. Sarkozy pushed the chancellor for a clear public declaration that Europe stood behind Greece. “I cannot buy that,” Ms. Merkel responded.

Eventually, Mr. Van Rompuy brokered a compromise, in the form of a nine-word sentence tacked on to a statement aides were scribbling out on a conference table: “The Greek government has not requested any financial support.” The language sneaked in a back-door mention of Greece, but it conformed to Ms. Merkel’s insistence that the country not be offered any help.

She had won the round.

Other European leaders believed Ms. Merkel was playing for time because of domestic politics. Her center-right coalition faced a crucial regional election on May 9 in North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany’s most populous state. Opinion polls showed voters were furious about the prospect of bailing out the profligate Greeks.

“It was clear that the election was playing a big role,” says the finance minister of another euro-zone country. Spokesmen for Ms. Merkel strenuously deny that North Rhine-Westphalia influenced her tactics on Greece.

The chancellor struggled to rein in speculation about an imminent bailout one Friday in late February, when the head of Germany’s biggest bank, Deutsche Bank Chief Executive Josef Ackermann, mysteriously appeared in Athens for consultations with Greek leaders. Mr. Ackermann had an idea for supplying Greece with up to €30 billion of credit—half from Germany and France, half from major European banks.

In a phone call from Athens that day, Mr. Ackermann pitched the proposal to Ms. Merkel’s chief economic adviser, Jens Weidmann. The reply: unacceptable. “You cannot tell the Greeks that this is a German government offer,” Mr. Weidmann said, fearing the already-widespread impression that Mr. Ackermann was acting as a go-between.

A posse of cameras met Mr. Ackermann when he emerged from the Greek parliament building. “I’m regularly in Greece because I love Greece and the beautiful weather,” a grinning Mr. Ackermann said, before disappearing into his armored Mercedes-Benz.

By mid-March, Greek Premier Papandreou was clamoring openly for Europe to reassure markets by putting money on the table. Ms. Merkel went on German public radio that month and said Greece didn’t need aid. An upcoming EU summit should focus on other issues—and other European leaders shouldn’t stir up “false expectations,” she said.

But behind the scenes, Ms. Merkel was starting to take over the contingency planning.

There was one thing the secret task force had agreed on: Europe, not the IMF, would handle any bailout. The German finance ministry felt the same. Involving the Washington-based fund in a bailout of Greece would be an admission of European weakness, Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble said publicly. Mr. Sarkozy, Mr. Juncker and ECB chief Trichet all shared that view strongly.

Ms. Merkel, however, overruled them all. Her advisers were telling her that aid to Greece could be sold to her skeptical countrymen only as part of a wrenching IMF program of economic adjustment for Greece. IMF-inflicted pain would also deter other indebted euro-zone countries from seeking aid.

The disagreement came to a head before the broader EU’s regular spring summit in Brussels on March 25.

That afternoon, before all 27 leaders gathered, Ms. Merkel met Mr. Sarkozy in one of the many spartan meeting rooms in the EU’s warren-like headquarters. The chancellor agreed to announce that the euro zone would rescue Greece if it faced default—but only as a last resort, once Greece had exhausted its access to capital markets. Also, the IMF must be part of any loan package, and the IMF—not the European Commission—should draw up Greece’s program of overhauls, she said.

Mr. Sarkozy protested against involving the IMF, whose biggest shareholder is the U.S. government. Europe cannot let “the Americans” decide who gets credit in Europe, he said.

Ms. Merkel put her foot down, insisting that only the IMF had the necessary experience. Mr. Sarkozy, recognizing that Germany’s financial muscle was essential for any bailout, reluctantly gave way.

On April 11, with the crisis of investor confidence spreading from Greek government bonds to the country’s banking system, the EU finally put money on the table. As Germany wanted, the €30 billion for the first year would come in the form of 15 separate government-to-government loans, while the IMF would lend another €15 billion. Officials hoped the sum, enough to cover Greece’s borrowing needs for less than a year, would be enough to calm markets.

It wasn’t.

Bancor: The Global Currency The IMF is Proposing

The Economic Collapse

Sometimes there are things that are so shocking that you just do not want to report them unless they can be completely and totally documented.  Over the past few years, there have been many rumors about a coming global currency, but at times it has been difficult to pin down evidence that plans for such a currency are actually in the works.  Not anymore.  A paper entitled “Reserve Accumulation and International Monetary Stability” by the Strategy, Policy and Review Department of the IMF recommends that the world adopt a global currency called the “Bancor” and that a global central bank be established to administer that currency.  The report is dated April 13, 2010 and a full copy can be read here.  Unfortunately this is not hype and it is not a rumor.  This is a very serious proposal in an official document from one of the mega-powerful institutions that is actually running the world economy.  Anyone who follows the IMF knows that what the IMF wants, the IMF usually gets.  So could a global currency known as the “Bancor” be on the horizon?  That is now a legitimate question.

So where in the world did the name “Bancor” come from?  Well, it turns out that ”Bancor” is the name of a hypothetical world currency unit once suggested by John Maynard Keynes.  Keynes was a world famous British economist who headed the World Banking Commission that created the IMF during the Breton Woods negotiations.

The Wikipedia entry for “Bancor” puts it this way….

The bancor was a World Currency Unit of clearing that was proposed by John Maynard Keynes, as leader of the British delegation and chairman of the World Bank commission, in the negotiations that established the Bretton Woods system, but has not been implemented.

The IMF report referenced above proposed naming the coming world currency unit the “Bancor” in honor of Keynes.

So what about Special Drawing Rights (SDRs)?  Over the past couple of years, SDRs have been touted as the coming global currency.  Well, the report does envision making SDRs “the principal reserve asset” as we move towards a global currency unit….

“As a complement to a multi-polar system, or even—more ambitiously—its logical end point, a greater role could be considered for the SDR.”

However, the report also acknowledges that SDRs do have some serious limitations.  Since the value of SDRs are closely tied to national currencies, anything affecting those currencies will affect SDRs as well.

Right now, SDRs are made up of a basket of currencies.  The following is a breakdown of the components of an SDR….

*U.S. Dollar (44 percent)

*Euro (34 percent)

*Yen (11 percent)

*Pound (11 percent)

The IMF report recognizes that moving to SDRs is only a partial move away from the U.S. dollar as the world reserve currency and urges the adoption of a currency unit that would be truly international.  The truth is that SDRs are clumsy and cumbersome.  For now, SDRs must still be reconverted back into a national currency before they can be used, and that really limits their usefulness according to the report….

“A limitation of the SDR as discussed previously is that it is not a currency. Both the SDR and SDR-denominated instruments need to be converted eventually to a national currency for most payments or interventions in foreign exchange markets, which adds to cumbersome use in transactions. And though an SDR-based system would move away from a dominant national currency, the SDR’s value remains heavily linked to the conditions and performance of the major component countries.”

So what is the answer?

Well, the IMF report believes that the adoption of a true global currency administered by a global central bank is the answer.

The authors of the report believe that it would be ideal if the “Bancor” would immediately be used as currency by many nations throughout the world, but they also acknowledge that a more “realistic” approach would be for the “Bancor” to circulate alongside national currencies at first….

“One option is for bancor to be adopted by fiat as a common currency (like the euro was), an approach that would result immediately in widespread use and eliminate exchange rate volatility among adopters (comparable, for instance, to Cooper 1984, 2006 and the Economist, 1988). A somewhat less ambitious (and more realistic) option would be for bancor to circulate alongside national currencies, though it would need to be adopted by fiat by at least some (not necessarily systemic) countries in order for an exchange market to develop.”

So who would print and administer the “Bancor”?

Well, a global central bank of course.  It would be something like the Federal Reserve, only completely outside the control of any particular national government….

“A global currency, bancor, issued by a global central bank (see Supplement 1, section V) would be designed as a stable store of value that is not tied exclusively to the conditions of any particular economy. As trade and finance continue to grow rapidly and global integration increases, the importance of this broader perspective is expected to continue growing.”

In fact, at one point the IMF report specifically compares the proposed global central bank to the Federal Reserve….

“The global central bank could serve as a lender of last resort, providing needed systemic liquidity in the event of adverse shocks and more automatically than at present. Such liquidity was provided in the most recent crisis mainly by the U.S. Federal Reserve, which however may not always provide such liquidity.”

So is that what we really need?

A world currency administered by an international central bank modeled after the Federal Reserve?

Not at all.

As I have written about previously, the Federal Reserve has devalued the U.S. dollar by over 95 percent since it was created and the U.S. government has accumulated the largest debt in the history of the world under this system.

So now we want to impose such a system on the entire globe?

The truth is that a global currency (whether it be called the “Bancor” or given a different name entirely) would be a major blow to national sovereignty and would represent a major move towards global government.

Considering how disastrous the Federal Reserve system and other central banking systems around the world have been, why would anyone suggest that we go to a global central banking system modeled after the Federal Reserve?

Let us hope that the “Bancor” never sees the light of day.

However, the truth is that there are some very powerful interests that are absolutely determined to create a global currency and a global central bank for the global economy that we now live in.

It would be a major mistake to think that it can’t happen.

As Predicted, Spain on the Brink of Collapse

The tentacles of the international banking cartel are about to envelop the fifth most important economy of the old continent

The Independent

European leaders meet in Brussels today amid growing fears that Spain, Europe’s fifth-largest economy, is preparing to ask for a

The horns of the depression are in Spain's rearview mirror. An aid package is in the works to rescue one more failed State.

bailout which would dwarf the €110bn (£90bn) rescue plan for Greece.

The Spanish government yesterday dismissed reports that it was already in discussions with the European Commission, International Monetary Fund and the US Treasury for a rescue package worth up to €250bn.

Officials in Madrid, Brussels and Paris were forced to deny that a Spanish bailout – which would take the European debt and euro crisis into a potentially dangerous new phase – was on the Brussels summit agenda.

“Spain is a country that is solvent, solid and strong, with international credibility,” said its Prime Minister, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero. The European Commission spokesman said: “I can firmly deny [that a Spanish rescue is under discussion]. I can say that that story is rubbish.”

Brussels diplomats have been at pains to send out feel-good signals ahead of a summit in which Europe’s leaders are supposed to take the first steps towards more disciplined and co-ordinated, control of national finances. Those reforms are meant to restore confidence in the euro and underpin the €750m EU and IMF safety-net, created last month for euroland countries that lose the confidence of the financial markets.

However, it is proving hard to shake off persistent market fears about Spain, which, if it needed a lifeline, would swallow up a large part of the emergency fund. Worryingly for the EU, the doubts about Spain – whether real or driven by speculation – are eerily similar to the gradual seeping away of confidence that sent Greece into a financial death spiral in March and April. The Spanish government’s cost of borrowing hit a new record yesterday. The interest rate gap, or spread, between 10-year Spanish bonds and their German equivalents, rose by more than 0.10 of a point to 2.23 percentage points.

A senior Spanish banker, Francisco Gonzalez, chairman of the BBVA financial services group, confirmed that foreign private banks were now refusing to provide liquidity to their Spanish counterparts. “Financial markets have withdrawn their confidence in our country,” he said. “For most Spanish companies and entities, international capital markets are closed.”

As a result, the European Central Bank is said to have provided record amounts of liquidity to Spanish banks in recent days. The closure of bank-to-bank credit to Spanish institutions recalls to some market commentators the ripple of crisis through the global financial system after the fall of Lehman Brothers in the Autumn of 2008.

The IMF chief Dominique Strauss-Kahn is expected in Madrid tomorrow to see Mr Zapatero – but brushed off speculation of a crisis. “It’s a working visit,” he told reporters in Paris. “I am in France [today] – are there such rumours about France?”

Fears over Spain’s finances checked the recovery of the euro on money markets yesterday. The single currency lost much of the gains it had made in the past seven days.

One of the proposals on the table at the Brussels summit is public “stress tests” to force banks to reveal the state of their books. The Spanish government offered yesterday to open the books of its own private banks unilaterally to prove that they were sound.

Today’s summit in Brussels was intended to be a time for the EU leaders to catch their breath and discuss ways of restoring the euro’s long-term credibility. The threatened Spanish crisis may blow all that out of the water.

Despite an apparent rapprochement between Paris and Berlin this week, President Nicolas Sarkozy and Chancellor Angela Merkel remain deeply divided on how to prevent the currency and debt crisis from dumping Europe back into recession. Mr Sarkozy has agreed to drop his proposals for new institutional machinery for a political “government” of the euro by its 16 member states. Ms Merkel prefers to talk of a vague “governance” of the euro, and European state spending, by all 27 EU governments.

More fundamentally, Paris is deeply concerned that the austerity plans announced by Berlin last week could – on top of budget cuts in other countries – plunge Europe into crisis.

The French fears were echoed yesterday by the billionaire investor, George Soros, who warned that Europe would almost certainly face a recession next year which might generate “social unrest” and the kind of populist nationalism seen in the 1930s. “That’s the real danger of the present situation – that by imposing fiscal discipline at a time of insufficient demand and a weak banking system… you are actually… setting in motion a downward spiral,” he said.

The collapse of Spain’s housing boom has helped fuel a deep downturn which has sent unemployment spiralling to 20 per cent, the second worst in the EU. Mr Zapatero introduced a range of measures last month, including spending cuts of €15bn over two years and reductions in public sector wages and spending. Unions have called a general strike over labour reforms.

Greece may Collapse in August, Economist

CNBC

A restructuring of Greek debt could happen as soon as August, when the Balkan country is due to receive another tranche of funds

The collapse of the greeks may just have been delayed, not avoided.

from its lending agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union, according to Carl Weinberg.

“You can’t take a country that’s over-borrowed and make it more creditworthy by lending it more money,” he said. “They’re throwing Greece further and further and further in the hole by not addressing the problem directly and properly.”Asked when a Greek default could happen, Weinberg answered: “at High-Frequency, we are advising people to take their cell phones on their August vacation.” He said a Greek default would be “harsh” for the euro.

Greek officials did not respond to CNBC.com requests for comment.

On Thursday, Nassim Taleb, professor and author of the bestselling book “The Black Swan,” told CNBC that the economic situation today is drastically worse than a couple of years ago, and that the euro is doomed as a concept.

But famous investor Jim Rogers said now may be a time to buy the single European currency, as there are so many investors who are bearish about it that a rally may be in the making.

IMF and EU funds worth about 7.5 billion euros ($9 billion), crucial for Greece to be able to pay foreign debt, are due to be disbursed at the end of August, Weinberg said.

“Unless (Greeks) meet the quantified adjustment targets that they agreed to in the memorandum of understanding with the IMF, they won’t get this money,” he said, adding that his bet is that Greece will not meet the criteria.

EU Won’t Let Default Happen

Under the memorandum of understanding, performance criteria include ceilings on the budget deficit, cutting government and social security spending, as well as revamping key public companies.

However, other analysts say the implications of a Greek default on the euro zone’s financial institutions and economy are so great that the two institutions will disburse the funds even if the country does not fully meet the criteria.

“By alimenting Greece, we are also alimenting the European banking system,” Hans Redeker, global head of foreign exchange at BNP Paribas, told CNBC.

“It is going to be tried to be protected as long as possible, to be sure that this country is viable economically,” Redeker added.

A Greek debt restructuring, if it happens, would be an orderly one, to cause as little pain to the euro as possible, Weinberg said.

Watch the testimony from Economist Carl Weinberg.